Closing the Equitable Loophole: Assessing the Supreme Court\u27s Next Move Regarding the Availability of Equitable Relief for Military Plaintiffs by Froelich, Christopher G.
   
 
699 
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Christopher G. Froelich∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In Feres v. United States,1 the United States Supreme Court held 
that members of the military could not sue government officials for 
injuries that “arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to 
service.”2  In so finding, the Court established a military exception to 
the Federal Tort Claims Act’s (“FTCA”)3 broad waiver of sovereign 
immunity.4  Since Feres, the breadth of the intramilitary immunity 
doctrine has expanded to preclude a variety of claims brought by 
military plaintiffs against their superior officers.5  In 1983, the 
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 1 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
 2 Id. at 146. 
 3 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2004). 
 4 See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2004).  Under the FTCA, the United States is liable for 
the acts of its employees “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private 
individual under like circumstances.”  Id.  The grant of jurisdiction to federal courts 
appears at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2004). 
 5 See Andrew P. Doman, United States v. Stanley: Has the Supreme Court Gone a 
Step too Far?, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 473, 476 n.24 (1987) (noting that very few military 
claims have prevailed under the intramilitary immunity doctrine adopted in Feres); 
Kevin J. Mahoney, United States v. Stanley: Has the Feres Doctrine Become a Grant of 
Absolute Immunity?, 23 NEW ENG. L. REV. 767 (1989); see also United States v. Johnson, 
481 U.S. 681 (1987) (denying an action for injuries sustained incident to service but 
caused by the negligence of civilian, rather than military, employees); United States 
v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985) (denying military damages claims by a serviceman 
whose injury occurred off-base and off-duty); Aguilar v. United States, 818 F.2d 194 
(2d Cir. 1987) (refusing recovery for injuries caused by exposure to chemical 
herbicide in Vietnam); Scheppan v. United States, 810 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(precluding recovery for medical malpractice); Flowers v. United States, 764 F.2d 759 
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Supreme Court, in Chappell v. Wallace,6 broadened the doctrine of 
intramilitary immunity to preclude certain claims for constitutional 
violations brought by aggrieved military personnel against their 
superiors.7  It is now legally established that military subordinates may 
not maintain damages claims in civilian courts for alleged 
constitutional violations committed by superior officers.8  The 
circumstances under which service members may initiate suits for 
equitable relief, however, remain entirely unclear. 
The Supreme Court has never drawn a precise line dividing 
justiciable from nonjusticiable intramilitary claims for equitable 
relief.9  As a result, there has been disagreement among several 
federal circuit courts of appeals as to when intramilitary actions for 
equitable relief are reviewable in civilian forums.10  The United States 
Courts of Appeals for the First,11 Third,12 and Tenth13 Circuits have 
embraced a general principle that intramilitary immunity only 
precludes claims in which military plaintiffs seek monetary damages.  
Accordingly, these circuits are quick to review intramilitary claims 
that challenge individualized military personnel decisions, so long as 
the relief sought happens to be equitable.  The United States Courts 
of Appeals for the Second,14 Fourth,15 Fifth,16 Seventh,17 Eighth,18 and 
 
(11th Cir. 1985) (holding that Feres bars recovery for injuries sustained going to and 
from a place of duty); Torres v. United States, 621 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1980) (refusing 
recovery for wrongful dishonorable discharge); Charland v. United States, 615 F.2d 
508 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that the Feres doctrine bars claim for off-duty and off-
base service member involved in a volunteer training program). 
 6 462 U.S. 296 (1983). 
 7 Id. at 305.  In Chappell, the Supreme Court held that enlisted military 
personnel were not entitled to a “Bivens-type remedy against their superior officers.”  
Id. at 304.  A “Bivens action,” first pronounced by the Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), provides 
a private right of action to citizens whose constitutional rights have been violated by 
federal officials.  See id. at 397.  For a more in-depth description of Bivens actions, see 
infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text. 
 8 See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683-84 (1987) (holding that “no 
Bivens remedy is available [to military personnel] for injuries that ‘arise out of or are 
in the course of activity incident to service.’”) (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 146). 
 9 See Dibble v. Fenimore, 339 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 10 See id. at 126-28. 
 11 Wigginton v. Centracchio, 205 F.3d 504 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 12 Jorden v. Nat’l Guard Bureau, 799 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 13 Walden v. Bartlett, 840 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 14 Dibble, 339 F.3d at 127-28. 
 15 Scott v. Rice, No. 92-2463, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 24641 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 
1993). 
 16 Crawford v. Tex. Army Nat’l Guard, 794 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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D.C.19 Circuits, however, have adopted the position that intramilitary 
immunity prohibits actions for both monetary and equitable relief, 
except where equitable actions amount to broad challenges to the 
constitutionality of military rules or regulations.  Not surprisingly, 
these circuits will not entertain equitable actions that challenge 
military personnel decisions, even where a service member’s 
constitutional rights are allegedly violated.20 
This Comment provides a detailed description of the current 
disagreement among the federal circuits as to the justiciability of 
equitable intramilitary actions that challenge personnel decision-
making, and argues that the Supreme Court will expand the 
intramilitary immunity doctrine once more to preclude all 
intramilitary claims for equitable relief, unless the action amounts to 
a broad constitutional challenge to the facial validity of a military 
edict.  Part I of this Comment briefly recounts the historical evolution 
of intramilitary immunity throughout common law England and 
under early American jurisprudence.  Part II focuses on the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Feres and its progeny, and outlines the current 
state of intramilitary immunity.  Part III sets forth a detailed circuit-
by-circuit account of the current incongruity among federal courts 
regarding the availability of equitable relief for military plaintiffs.  
Finally, Part IV examines the instructions so far provided by the 
Supreme Court as to the availability of equitable relief for military 
plaintiffs, and proposes that, based on these precedents, the Supreme 
Court will eventually expand the doctrine of intramilitary immunity 
once again to preclude all intramilitary claims for equitable relief that 
do not amount to facial challenges to the constitutionality of military 
regulations. 
I.  INTRAMILITARY IMMUNITY: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Intramilitary Immunity from Tort Liability in Common Law 
England 
The roots of intramilitary immunity date back to early England.21  
 
 17 Knutson v. Wis. Air Nat’l Guard, 995 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 18 Watson v. Ark. Nat’l Guard, 886 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 19 Kreis v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 20 See Dibble, 339 F.3d at 126. 
 21 For an excellent account of the development of intramilitary immunity 
throughout common law England see generally Donald Zillman, Intramilitary Tort 
Law: Incidence to Service Meets Constitutional Tort, 60 N.C. L. REV. 489 (1982).  See also 
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Under English common law, no civil actions in tort were permitted 
against the Crown or any of its subordinates for misdeeds expressly 
authorized by the State, or for wrongs committed by state officials 
during the course of their employment.22  By extension, English 
common law afforded immunity to the Crown from liability for all 
tort claims brought by military personnel against the national 
government.23  Individual officers, however, did not enjoy the same 
immunity as the Crown.24  As a consequence, most early English 
intramilitary claims involved suits for intentional conduct brought by 
military servicemen against their superior officers.25 
Several cases highlight the development of intramilitary 
immunity under British common law.  Sutton v. Johnstone26 was the first 
case to set a major precedent in that realm.  Sutton considered 
whether a naval officer could be held civilly liable when, under 
authority of the Crown, he maliciously and without good reason 
mistreated a subordinate officer.27 
Johnstone was the squadron commander of a 1786 British Naval 
expedition.28  After Johnstone’s squadron came under attack by 
French war ships, Sutton, a subordinate commanding officer of one 
of the expedition’s ships, failed upon a direct order to promptly 
pursue the French attackers.29  Johnstone then, on grounds of 
cowardice, treachery, disloyalty, and disobedience, removed Sutton 
from command, arrested and imprisoned him for over two years, and 
later court-martialed him.30  Sutton, after being acquitted on all 
 
Mahoney, supra note 5, at 768-71 (describing the development of intramilitary 
immunity from tort liability in common law England).  This Comment recounts 
some of that development for the convenience of the reader. 
 22 T. ELLIS LEWIS, WINFIELD ON TORTS 100 (6th ed. 1954).  Neither heads of state 
departments nor superior officers of the state were personally liable for the tortious 
actions of their subordinates, unless they expressly authorized the wrongs 
committed.  Id. at 100-01.  In that instance, the individual could be liable in his 
personal capacity, but not as an agent or officer of the Crown.  Id. at 101.  Nor could 
the Crown or any state department be held vicariously liable for any such action.  Id.  
State departments enjoyed the same immunity afforded the Crown unless expressly 
provided otherwise by statute.  Id. (citing as an example the Ministry of Transport 
Act, 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 50, § 26 (Eng.)). 
 23 See Zillman, supra note 21, at 492. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 99 Eng. Rep. 1215 (K.B. 1786). 
 27 Id. at 1220. 
 28 Id. at 1218. 
 29 Id. at 1216. 
 30 Id. at 1217. 
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charges by a court-martial, brought civil claims against Johnstone for 
his arrest and suspension, for damage done to his reputation, and for 
malicious prosecution.31  In his defense, Johnstone asserted that no 
civil cause of action could be established where claims involving 
court-martial proceeding were based upon actions taken by superior 
officers in the course of military discipline.32  In the alternative, 
Johnstone claimed that Sutton’s arrest and subsequent court-martial 
were warranted by his refusal to obey direct orders.33  The Court of 
Exchequer, sitting on appeal, rejected both of Johnstone’s 
contentions and affirmed judgment for Sutton.34 
Upon writ of error, the Lord Chancellor found in Johnstone’s 
favor, holding that no cause of action existed because Sutton’s 
prosecution was established upon probable cause.35  After addressing 
the essential issues raised, the court, in dicta, focused on the issue of 
immunity.36  Amid concerns that civilian review of intramilitary claims 
might threaten military discipline, Justice Mansfield seemed to 
embrace the notion of absolute immunity.37  The Justice reasoned 
 
 31 Id. at 1218. 
 32 Sutton, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1220. 
 33 See Zillman, supra note 21, at 493. 
 34 Id.  Baron Eyre, writing the opinion for the Court of Exchequer, acknowledged 
circumstances in which civil courts must defer considerably to the decisions made by 
military superiors.  Id.  The court, however, refused to proffer absolute immunity to 
military officials from tort actions that arise incident to service, holding that civil 
review of military conduct would not adversely affect military effectiveness.  Id. at 493-
94. 
 35 Sutton, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1243 (“There is no similitude or analogy between an 
action of trespass, or false imprisonment, and this kind of action.  An action of 
trespass is for the defendant’s having done that, which, upon the stating of it, is 
manifestly illegal.  This kind of action is for a prosecution, which, upon the stating of 
it, is manifestly legal.”). 
 36 See Zillman, supra note 21, at 494. 
 37 Sutton, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1246.  The court explained: 
The salvation of this country depends upon the discipline of the 
fleet; without discipline they would be a rabble, dangerous only to their 
friends, and harmless to the enemy. 
Commanders, in a day of battle, must act upon delicate 
suspicions; upon the evidence of their own eye; they must give 
desperate commands; they must require instantaneous obedience.  In 
case of a general misbehaviour, they may be forced to suspend several 
officers, and put others in their places. 
A military tribunal is capable of feeling all these circumstances, 
and understanding that the first, second, and third part of a soldier is 
obedience.  But what condition will a commander be in, if, upon the 
exercising of his authority, he is liable to be tried by a common law 
judicature? 
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that military law, and not the civil system, was appropriately equipped 
to address all grievances by servicemen, even where superior officers 
use discretionary powers maliciously to abuse or oppress their 
subordinates.38 
Eighty years later, in Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby,39 the English court 
again addressed the availability of civil remedies for intramilitary 
transgressions.  That case arose when Dawkins, an officer in the 
Coldstream Guards, was arrested and jailed for eleven days after 
refusing to shake hands with Lord Rokeby, his superior officer.40  
Rokeby ultimately caused Dawkins to retire from the military at half-
pay.41  Dawkins brought a civil action against Lord Rokeby for false 
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy to cause his 
early retirement from the military.42  The court found that Dawkins 
could not obtain redress in civil court even if it were shown that Lord 
Rokeby acted maliciously and without probable cause.43  The compact 
between soldier and the military, the court stated, prevents the 
former from seeking civil compensation.44  The court reasoned that 
men who join the military forfeit some constitutional rights and 
subject themselves to “military rule and military discipline.”45  The 
court also suggested that civilian courts were incompetent to resolve 
military matters,46 and that the military system of justice was a more 
 
If this action is admitted, every acquittal before a court-martial 
will produce one. 
Not knowing the law, or the rules of evidence, no commander 
or superior officer will dare to act; their inferiors will insult and 
threaten them. 
Id.  Subsequent opinions indicate that many in the House of Lords did not fully 
agree with Mansfield’s assessment of the immunity issue.  See Zillman, supra note 21, 
at 494 (citing Warden v. Bailey, 128 Eng. Rep. 253, 256 (K.B. 1811) (comment of 
Lawrence, J.)). 
 38 Sutton, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1246  (“The person unjustly accused is not without his 
remedy.  He has the properest among military men.  Reparation is done to him by an 
acquittal.  And he who accused him unjustly is blasted for ever, and dismissed the 
service.”).  Significantly however, the court, immediately following, recognized that 
such determinations as to the appropriateness of affording military officers absolute 
immunity from suit were not essential to its immediate holding, and indicated that 
such an important consideration was a question for the highest judicial authority.  Id. 
 39 176 Eng. Rep. 800 (L.R.-C.P. 1866). 
 40 Id. at 800-04. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 800. 
 43 Id. at 812. 
 44 Id. at 811. 
 45 Dawkins, 176 Eng. Rep. at 811. 
 46 Id. (“[A] man, by becoming a soldier, and receiving the Queen’s pay, does 
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appropriate forum for Dawkins’ claims.47 
Dawkins brought a subsequent action for defamation against 
Lord Paulet, another of his superior officers.48  That claim arose when 
Lord Paulet made derogatory comments about Dawkins to his 
superiors while forwarding along Dawkins’ initial complaints about 
Lord Rokeby.49  The court, in a split decision, held that Lord Paulet 
was entitled to immunity because the defamatory comments alleged 
were uttered while in performance of military duties.50  Moreover, the 
court suggested that Lord Paulet could not be prosecuted in a civilian 
forum even for administering his military duties maliciously.51  In 
finding Dawkins’ claim nonjusticiable, the court, relying heavily on 
Sutton, echoed the military discipline and expertise rationales.52  In its 
view, the Articles of War, promulgated by Parliament, had exclusive 
authority over Dawkins’ claim.53 
It is clear that English courts never adopted a policy of absolute 
immunity for military officers from civil tort claims arising out of 
actions taken in performance of military duties.54  It is equally clear, 
however, that English courts were comfortable affording military 
officers substantial deference to administer their military duties.55  
Rationales for affording such deference included the need to ensure 
 
agree and consent that he shall be subject to military discipline, and he cannot 
appeal to civil courts to rescue him from his own compact.”). 
 47 Id. at 812.  Dawkins brought a second claim against Lord Rokeby, alleging libel 
and slander for comments made by him during a court of inquiry regarding 
Dawkins’ unsuitability for command.  Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, 8 L.R.-Q.B. 255 
(1873).  The court, while ultimately dismissing Dawkins’ claims, limited its holding to 
the immunity afforded witnesses during civil proceedings, so the ruling was unclear 
as to the scope of immunity afforded military officials.  Id. at 263-64.  The court did 
state, however, that Sutton provided authority “that a case involving questions of 
military discipline and military duty alone are cognisable only by a military tribunal, 
and not by a court of law.”  Id. at 271. 
 48 Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, 5 L.R.-Q.B. 94 (1869). 
 49 Id. at 111-12. 
 50 Id. at 113-15. 
 51 Id. at 114 (“I apprehend that the motives under which a man acts in doing a 
duty which it is incumbent upon him to do, cannot make the doing of that duty 
actionable [in a civilian court], however maliciously they may be.”). 
 52 See id. at 114-17. 
 53 Id. at 117. 
 54 Dawkins, 5 L.R.-Q.B. at 117; see also Frazer v. Balfour, 87 L.J.K.B. 1116 (1918) 
(recognizing that the issue of intramilitary immunity was still unresolved and noting 
that the issue involved “constitutional questions of the utmost gravity”). 
 55 See Dawkins, 176 Eng. Rep. at 812 (finding that a military subordinate might 
still be denied civil compensation for an injury caused by a superior officer acting 
maliciously and in bad faith). 
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an effective system of military discipline and the perceived 
incompetence of civilian courts to sit in plenary review of military 
matters.  Perhaps not surprisingly, these same sentiments were 
echoed throughout early American common law, and continue to 
reverberate today in courthouses across the country struggling to 
determine the appropriate function of civilian courts in intramilitary 
disputes. 
B.  Intramilitary Immunity Under American Common Law 
American common law did not always afford military officers 
absolute immunity from damages claims involving intramilitary 
torts.56  In Wilson v. Mackenzie,57 for example, a naval officer was sued 
for beating and imprisoning an enlisted landsman.  The defendant 
claimed entitlement to absolute immunity by virtue of his position as 
a naval officer.58  The New York Supreme Court of Judicature, 
however, allowed the claim to proceed, observing that English courts 
permitted civil suits for actions taken in the name of military 
discipline.59 
In 1849, the United States Supreme Court first wrestled with the 
intramilitary immunity issue in Wilkes v. Dinsman.60  In that case, 
Captain Wilkes, a United States naval commander, headed a 
government expedition to the South Seas.61  Dinsman, a marine 
serving on one of the expedition’s ships, refused to follow orders 
after a dispute arose concerning his status as an enlisted man.62  
Captain Wilkes, apparently concerned that Dinsman might incite 
mutiny, had the marine flogged, arrested, and imprisoned for 
refusing to perform his regular duties.63  Dinsman eventually sought 
redress in civil court for assault, false imprisonment, and for 
violations of his constitutional rights.64  The Supreme Court held that 
military officers are not liable in civil actions for exercising official 
discretion, unless power is exercised outside of military authority in a 
 
 56 See Zillman, supra note 21, at 499. 
 57 7 Hill 95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845). 
 58 Id. at 100. 
 59 Id. 
 60 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89 (1849). 
 61 Zillman, supra note 21, at 499. 
 62 Id. at 499-500. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 500. 
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malicious, cruel, or willfully oppressive manner.65  The presumption 
existed, the Court held, that an officer has legitimately performed his 
duties in good faith unless it could be proven otherwise.66  The Court 
emphasized that officers cannot be liable for errors in judgment, but 
may be punished civilly for administering military authority in bad 
conscience.67 
Upon remand, a jury found in favor of Captain Wilkes and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari for a second time.68  The Court, 
attempting to clarify its earlier decision, reiterated that Captain 
Wilkes was not liable for discharging military authority in good faith, 
even where such authority was exercised in error.69  Chief Justice 
Taney, recognizing the gravity of the issue and attempting to balance 
the needs of individual servicemen with the unique structure of the 
military, stated: 
The case is one of much delicacy and importance as regards our 
naval service.  For it is essential to its security and efficiency that 
the authority and command confided to the officer, when it has 
been exercised from proper motives, should be firmly supported 
in the courts of justice, as well as on shipboard.  And if it is not, 
the flag of the United States would soon be dishonored in every 
sea.  But at the same time it must be borne in mind that the 
nation would be equally dishonored, if it permitted the humblest 
individual in its service to be oppressed and injured by his 
commanding officer, from malice or ill-will, or the wantonness of 
power, without giving him redress in the courts of justice.70 
So, the Court, while recognizing the strong public interest in 
preserving the establishment of military discipline, did not go as far 
as many of its English predecessors, insofar as it recognized a civil 
cause of action where superior officers act maliciously or outside the 
scope of their authority.71  Pursuant to Dinsman, therefore, military 
defendants were clearly not immune to judicial penalties. 
As governments enacted statutes waiving sovereign immunity for 
the tortious acts of their agents, an alternative system of recovery for 
 
 65 Wilkes, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 130. 
 66 Id. at 130-32. 
 67 Id. at 130-31. 
 68 Dinsman v. Wilkes, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 390 (1851). 
 69 Id. at 403-04. 
 70 Id. at 403. 
 71 See id. 
  
708 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:699 
 
 
military plaintiffs emerged.72  In Dobson v. United States,73 for example, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed 
whether military personnel could recover civil damages pursuant to 
the Public Vessels Act,74 which subjected the federal government to 
liability for “damage caused by a public vessel of the United States.”75  
In refusing to provide relief, the Second Circuit injected into the 
Public Vessels Act a prohibition against military claims, even though 
the statute itself was silent regarding torts arising incident to military 
service.76  In reaching its determination, the court acknowledged the 
availability of military systems of recourse.77 
In Goldstein v. New York,78 a national guardsman sued the State of 
New York under the New York Court of Claims Act (“Claims Act”) for 
the negligence of a fellow guardsman.  The New York Court of 
Appeals ruled that military personnel were not “officers or 
employees” within the meaning of the Claims Act, and were therefore 
precluded from statutory recovery.79  The court, however, seemed to 
echo the sentiment articulated in Dobson—that military systems of 
 
 72 See, e.g., Suits in Admiralty Act, Pub. L. No. 66-156, 41 Stat. 525 (1920) (current 
version at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-752 (2004)) (permitting suits against the United 
States in admiralty cases when the government’s merchant vessels negligently caused 
injury); Public Vessels Act, Pub. L. No. 68-546, 43 Stat. 1112 (1925) (current version 
at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 781-790 (2004)) (granting authority to sue the United States in 
admiralty when public vessels caused damages, and allowing recovery for towage and 
salvage services rendered to public vessels); Military Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 78-112, 
57 Stat. 372 (1943) (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 2731-2739 (2004)) (authorizing 
designated officers to administratively settle small claims for damages, loss of 
property, or for personal injury or death caused by military or civilian personnel); 
Federal Employee Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 64-267, 39 Stat. 742 (1916) 
(current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8152 (2004)) (providing compensation for 
federal civilian employees injured while performing their duties), cited in John Astley, 
Note, United States v. Johnson: Feres Doctrine Gets New Life and Continues to Grow, 38 
AM. U. L. REV. 185, 190 n.31 (1988). 
 73 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928). 
 74 Act of Mar. 3, 1925, ch. 428, § 1, 43 Stat. 1112 (revised Aug. 26, 1983) (current 
version at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 781-790 (2004)). 
 75 Id. 
 76 See Dobson, 27 F.2d at 808-09.  The Dobson court explicitly acknowledged that no 
language within the Public Vessels Act precluded claims by members of the military.  
Id. at 808.  The court, however, found that a statutory construction allowing military 
remedies would “involve[] so radical a departure from the government’s long-
standing policy with respect to the personnel of its naval forces that we cannot 
believe the act should be given such a meaning.”  Id. at 808-09. 
 77 Id.  The court made specific reference to a statutory pension system set up for 
enlisted naval personnel injured or killed in the line of duty.  Id. 
 78 24 N.E.2d 97 (1939). 
 79 Id. at 101. 
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compensation are the proper venue for servicemen seeking redress 
for injuries resulting from military service.80 
American courts consistently found ways to deny relief to service 
members for injuries suffered during military activity.81  On the 
whole, these courts, like their English predecessors, cited the 
importance of military discipline and the availability of alternative 
systems of redress as the principle reasons to deny relief.82 
C.  The Federal Tort Claims Act 
A significant development in the evolution of the American 
doctrine of intramilitary immunity came in 1946, when Congress 
enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act.83  Generally, the FTCA subjects 
the United States to liability for negligent or wrongful acts committed 
by governmental agents operating within the scope of their 
employment.84  The FTCA arose in response to general concerns over 
the injustices presented when citizens, injured by the tortious acts of 
government officials, were denied recovery on the basis of sovereign 
immunity.85  The Act provides, in part, that “[t]he United States shall 
be liable . . . to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same 
 
 80 See id. at 100 (“We think that the general understanding has always been that 
for injuries suffered by a soldier in active service the government makes provision by 
way of pension . . . . [A] complete system is set up for handling such claims.”). 
 81 See Zillman, supra note 21, at 502. 
 82 See, e.g., Bradley v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1845); O’Neal v. United 
States, 11 F.2d 869 (E.D.N.Y. 1925); Moon v. Hines, 87 So. 603 (Ala. 1921); Seidel v. 
Director General, 89 So. 308 (La. 1921); McAuliffe v. New York, 176 N.Y.S. 679 (N.Y. 
Ct. Cl. 1919), cited in Zillman, supra note 21, at 502 nn.68-69. 
 83 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2004). 
 84 See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2004). 
 85 See Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957).  As the Rayonier Court 
acknowledged: 
Congress was aware that when losses caused by [governmental] 
negligence are charged against the public treasury they are in effect 
spread among all those who contribute financially to the support of the 
Government and the resulting burden on each taxpayer is relatively 
slight. But when the entire burden falls on the injured party it may 
leave him destitute or grievously harmed. Congress could, and 
apparently did, decide that this would be unfair when the public as a 
whole benefits from the services performed by Government employees. 
Id. at 320; see also J. Thomas Morina, Denial of Atomic Veterans’ Tort Claims: The 
Enduring Fallout from Feres v. United States, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259, 261 (1983) 
(stating that the FTCA was motivated by a desire to avoid the “time consuming, 
inefficient, and often inequitable process of reviewing . . . private bills” sanctioning 
governmental liability). 
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extent as a private individual under like circumstances.”86  
Furthermore, the terms of the FTCA allow for governmental liability 
in the state where the incident occurs.87  The FTCA, therefore, 
extended existing common law tort jurisprudence to the United 
States as a defendant. 
Congress specified several exceptions in which liability pursuant 
to the FTCA does not extend to the United States.88  Although 
 
 86 28 U.S.C. § 2674. 
 87 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2004). 
 88 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2004).  The exceptions read as follows: 
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the 
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or 
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based 
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform 
a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an 
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved 
be abused. 
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent 
transmission of letters or postal matter. 
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any 
tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or 
other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law 
enforcement officer, except that the provisions of this chapter [28 
USCS §§ 2671 et seq.] and section 1346(b) of this title apply to any 
claim based on injury or loss of goods, merchandise, or other property, 
while in the possession of any officer of customs or excise or any other 
law enforcement officer, if— 
 (1) the property was seized for the purpose of forfeiture under any 
provision of Federal law providing for the forfeiture of property other 
than as a sentence imposed upon conviction of a criminal offense; 
 (2) the interest of the claimant was not forfeited; 
 (3) the interest of the claimant was not remitted or mitigated (if the 
property was subject to forfeiture); and 
 (4) the claimant was not convicted of a crime for which the interest 
of the claimant in the property was subject to forfeiture under a 
Federal criminal forfeiture law.[.] 
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-752, 781-
790 of Title 46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the 
United States. 
(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the 
Government in administering the provisions of sections 1-31 of Title 
50, Appendix. 
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of 
a quarantine by the United States. 
(g) [Repealed] 
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false 
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: 
Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law 
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Congress considered many provisions significantly limiting 
governmental exposure to liability in situations involving military 
personnel,89 it ultimately chose to preclude only “claim[s] arising out 
of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast 
Guard, during time of war.”90 
In 1949, the United States Supreme Court had its first 
opportunity to determine whether military personnel could maintain 
actions against the federal government pursuant to the FTCA.  In 
Brooks v. United States,91 two claims were filed against the government 
after a negligently driven Army truck struck the vehicle of two 
servicemen while both were off-base and off-duty; one serviceman was 
injured and the other was killed.92  The government sought dismissal 
of both actions, arguing that each plaintiff was precluded from civil 
recovery given his enlisted status at the time of the accident.93  The 
Court, recognizing that Congress considered and then refused 
 
enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions 
of this chapter [28 USCS §§ 2671 et seq.] and section 1346(b) of this 
title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the 
enactment of this proviso [enacted March 16, 1974], out of assault, 
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious 
prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, “investigative or law 
enforcement officer” means any officer of the United States who is 
empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make 
arrests for violations of Federal law. 
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the 
Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system. 
(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or 
naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war. 
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country. 
(l) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority. 
(m) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal 
Company. 
(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a 
Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for co-operatives. 
 89 See H.R. 12178, 68th Cong. (1925); H.R. 12179, 68th Cong. (1925); S. 1912, 
69th Cong. (1925); H.R. 6716, 69th Cong. (1926); H.R. 8914, 69th Cong. (1926); 
H.R. 9285, 70th Cong. (1928); S. 4377, 71st Cong. (1930); H.R. 15428, 71st Cong. 
(1931); H.R. 16429, 71st Cong. (1931); H.R. 17168, 71st Cong. (1931); H.R. 5065, 
72d Cong. (1932); S. 211, 72d Cong. (1932); S. 4567, 72d Cong. (1932); S. 1833, 73d 
Cong. (1933); H.R. 129, 73d Cong. (1933); H.R. 8561, 73d Cong. (1934); H.R. 2028, 
74th Cong. (1935); S. 1043, 74th Cong. (1935), cited in Brooks v. United States, 337 
U.S. 49, 51 (1949). 
 90 28 U.S.C. § 2860(j) (2004). 
 91 337 U.S. 49 (1949). 
 92 Id. at 50. 
 93 Id. at 50-51. 
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several versions of the FTCA that would have provided immunity 
from military claims, held that military personnel were not necessarily 
precluded from redress under the Act.94  While the Court allowed the 
claims to proceed, it predicated its decision upon findings that the 
military plaintiffs involved were not engaged in military activities at 
the time of the incident.95  Thus, the Court did not adjudicate the 
broader issue of whether military personnel could sustain FTCA 
claims for injuries suffered during military service.96 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE FERES DOCTRINE 
A.  Feres v. United States 
In 1950, the Supreme Court dealt a severe blow to the aggrieved 
military plaintiff’s ability to recover damages under the FTCA for 
injuries suffered during military service.  Feres v. United States97 
involved three negligence claims brought by servicemen against the 
government for injuries resulting from their military activities.  The 
first claim was brought on behalf of Rudolph J. Feres, a serviceman 
killed in a barracks fire.98  The second suit, brought by serviceman 
Arthur K. Jefferson, arose after military doctors mistakenly left a towel 
inside of his abdomen during a routine surgical procedure.99  The 
final action, also for medical negligence, was brought on behalf of 
deceased serviceman Dudley R. Griggs.100  The Supreme Court, after 
consolidating the three claims, held that the federal government is 
not liable under the FTCA for injuries to servicemen that arise from 
activities “incident to service.”101 
The Court articulated several justifications for its decision.  First, 
American law traditionally did not allow recovery for servicemen 
injured during military performance.102  The Court reasoned that the 
responsibility for clarifying the intent of the FTCA in that respect 
rested exclusively with Congress.103  Second, the Court foresaw 
 
 94 Id. at 51-54. 
 95 Id. at 52-53. 
 96 See id. 
 97 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
 98 Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949). 
 99 Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949). 
 100 Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949). 
 101 Feres, 340 U.S. at 146. 
 102 Id. at 141-42. 
 103 Id. at 138-41. 
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impracticality in applying the FTCA to military claims because the 
controlling substantive law in each action would depend upon the 
location where the injury occurred.104  Subjecting military personnel 
to the nuances of each state’s body of tort law would be irrational, the 
Court explained, especially given the distinctly federal nature of the 
relationship between soldier and government.105  Lastly, the Court 
reasoned that military compensation schemes were analogous to 
workmen’s compensation, and suggested that military injuries could 
be appropriately addressed within those specialized venues.106 
The Feres Court, thus, succeeded in creating a relatively broad 
sphere of immunity for government officials from military claims by 
establishing such a significant exception to the FTCA.107  While the 
decision is certainly not immune from criticism,108 it is now quite clear 
that service members are precluded from bringing actions under the 
FTCA for injuries suffered during military activity.109  Since Feres, the 
Supreme Court has observed that the Feres doctrine is designed 
largely to prevent federal courts from interfering with military 
discipline and decision-making.110 
 
 104 Id. at 142-43. 
 105 Id. at 143 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947)). 
 106 Id. at 144-45. 
 107 Feres, 340 U.S. at 144-45. 
 108 See, e. g., Sanchez v. United States, 813 F.2d 593, 595 (2d Cir. 1987); Bozeman 
v. United States, 780 F.2d 198, 200 (2d Cir. 1985); Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 
96, 97 (3d Cir. 1983); Mondelli v. United States, 711 F.2d 567, 569 (3d Cir. 1983); 
Scales v. United States, 685 F.2d 970, 974 (5th Cir. 1982); LaBash v. United States 
Dept. of Army, 668 F.2d 1153, 1156 (10th Cir. 1982); Monaco v. United States, 661 
F.2d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1981); Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580, 589 (D.C. Cir. 
1980); Veillette v. United States, 615 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir. 1980); Parker v. United 
States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 1980); Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605, 606 
(3d Cir. 1973); Barry Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, Discipline, and the Weapons of War, 29 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 383 (1985); Lt. Col. Robert A. Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims Act and 
Military Personnel, 8 RUTGERS L. REV. 316 (1954); Capt. Robert L. Rhodes, The Feres 
Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F. L. REV. 24 (1976); Mark Lloyd Smith, Note, 
Federal Tort Claims Act – Government Liability for Personal Injuries to Military Personnel, 51 
J. AIR L. & COM. 1087 (1986); Susan Cohen-Klein & Howard Berkower, Note, The 
Cancer Spreads: Atomic Veterans Powerless in the Aftermath of Feres v. United States, 6 
CARDOZO L. REV. 391 (1984); Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel 
Have Access to FTCA Recovery?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1099 (1979); Note, Military Rights 
Under the FTCA, 43 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 455 (1969), cited in United States v. Johnson, 
481 U.S. 681, 701 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In Johnson, Justice Scalia indicated 
that Feres should be overruled, and suggested that any criticism the decision has ever 
received is “heartily deserve[d].”  Id. at 700-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 109 See, e.g., Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691-92. 
 110 See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963).  In Muniz, the Court 
explained: 
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B. Extension of the Feres Doctrine to Constitutional Torts 
1. The Constitutional Tort 
Tort claims for damages resulting from violations of 
constitutional rights have been a major development over the last 
several years.111  Section 1983 of the Federal Civil Rights Act112 was the 
first instrument to sanction individual claims to redress constitutional 
and statutory violations resulting from actions taken by state officials 
under the color of state law.  Federal branches of the military, 
however, remain outside the purview of § 1983 because of the 
statutory requirement that constitutional violations be committed at 
the hands of state actors.113  As a result, much of § 1983 litigation 
concerning military plaintiffs involves claims by national guardsmen 
against state officials.114 
In 1971, the Supreme Court, on its own initiative, significantly 
expanded the ability of individuals to maintain actions against federal 
officials for constitutional violations, even when no federal statute 
authorizes a specific claim.  In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics,115 a plaintiff sought damages for violations 
of his constitutional rights after federal agents, under the color of 
federal authority, ransacked his apartment during an unlawful and 
warrantless search and seizure.116  The government urged that the 
plaintiff’s asserted right to privacy was a creation of state law, and was 
 
In the last analysis, Feres seems best explained by “the peculiar 
and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of 
the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results 
that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for 
negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of 
military duty . . . .” 
Id. (citing United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954)); see also Stencel Aero 
Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672-73 (1977) (emphasizing that Feres is 
supported in part by the negative effect on military discipline that would result from 
second guessing military decision-making); Johnson, 481 U.S. at 684 (same). 
 111 See Zillman, supra note 21, at 526. 
 112 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004). 
 113 See id. 
 114 See, e.g., Wigginton v. Centracchio, 205 F.3d 504 (1st Cir. 2000); Jorden v. Nat’l 
Guard Bureau, 799 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1986); Crawford v. Tex. Army Nat’l Guard, 794 
F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1986); Christoffersen v. Wash. State Air Nat’l Guard, 855 F.2d 
1437 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 115 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 116 Id. at 389. 
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therefore only redressable in state court.117  The Supreme Court 
rejected the government’s position, however, and held that the 
Fourth Amendment itself created a general right to maintain actions 
for damages when federal officials invade legal rights.118  The Court 
concluded that the plaintiff could recover monetary damages because 
“no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative 
action by Congress” were present.119  Thus, Bivens created a federal 
common law counterpart to § 1983 for constitutional violations 
committed by federal officials. 
2. Chappell v. Wallace—The “Equitable Exception” to 
Intramilitary Immunity Articulated 
In 1972, the Supreme Court revisited its holding in Bivens to 
confront the issue of whether enlisted military personnel could 
maintain Bivens-type actions against their superior officers for 
constitutional violations suffered during military service.  In Chappell 
v. Wallace,120 five black Navy enlisted men brought claims to recover 
damages from several of their superior officers, alleging that they 
were discriminated against on the basis of race in violation of their 
constitutional rights.121  The Supreme Court, rejecting a Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals conclusion that Bivens authorized damages for the 
constitutional violations alleged in the plaintiffs’ complaints,122 held 
that military personnel could not maintain damages claims against 
superior officers, even when their constitutional rights were 
violated.123  Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, offered 
several justifications for its decision.  Initially, the Court reiterated 
that Bivens-type remedies should be precluded when “special factors 
counselling hesitation are present.”124  The Court then stressed the 
importance of maintaining the establishment of military discipline 
and noted several difficulties presented when civilian courts 
 
 117 See id. at 390-91. 
 118 Id. at 395-97. 
 119 Id. at 396.  Since Bivens, the Supreme Court has found that actions for damages 
can be brought directly under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and 
under the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.  
See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 120 462 U.S. 296 (1983). 
 121 Id. at 297. 
 122 See Wallace v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 123 Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305. 
 124 Id. at 298.  The “special factors” analysis, the Court noted, also formed the basis 
for its decision in Feres.  Id. at 298-99. 
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haphazardly interfere with “the peculiar and special relationship of 
the soldier to his superiors.”125  Accordingly, Justice Burger warned 
that civilian courts must think long and hard before tampering in 
matters concerning the unique relationship between officer and 
enlisted man—a bond essential to the establishment of an effective 
military structure.126 
Next, the Chappell Court expressed its view that the United States 
Constitution provides Congress and the President, not civilian courts, 
with direct and exhaustive control over the framework of military 
rights, duties, and responsibilities, as well as over military regulations 
and procedures.127  The Court posited that Congress exercised its 
plenary authority over the military by establishing an independent 
internal military system of justice to regulate disciplinary matters.128  
The Court also noted the availability of military administrative 
procedures to aggrieved enlisted men and suggested that those 
channels of redress, such as the disciplinary board specifically 
provided for by the Navy, are far more appropriate and better 
equipped to regulate military life than are federal courts.129  
Moreover, the Court reasoned, because Congress did not provide for 
a damages remedy within the military justice system for aggrieved 
servicemen, it would be entirely inconsistent for courts to do so—
especially given the clear constitutional authority afforded Congress 
to regulate such matters.130  The Court concluded that “[t]aken 
together, the unique disciplinary structure of the military 
establishment and Congress’ activity in the field constitute ‘special 
factors’ which dictate that it would be inappropriate to provide 
enlisted military personnel a Bivens-type remedy against their 
superior officers.”131 
 
 125 Id. at 300 (citing United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954)). 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 300-02 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14). 
 128 Chappell, 462 U.S. at 302. 
 129 Id. at 302-04.  The Court made specific reference to the procedures and 
remedies established by Congress in Article 138 of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, which allows any aggrieved member of the armed forces to file complaints 
against his superior officers directly with the official “exercising general court-martial 
jurisdiction over the officer against whom [the complaint] is made.”  Id. at 302-03 
(citing 10 U.S.C. § 938 (2004)).  The Court also recognized the Board for the 
Correction of Naval Records set up by Congress as another means by which plaintiffs 
could have sought to correct the injustices alleged in their complaints.  Id. at 303 
(citing 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a) (2004)). 
 130 Id. at 304. 
 131 Id. 
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Before finalizing its opinion, the Court stated that it “has never 
held, nor do we now hold, that military personnel are barred from all 
redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the 
course of military service.”132  Justice Burger then provided three 
examples of military claims maintained by servicemen to redress 
constitutional violations that were justiciable in federal courts.133  
Each case cited by the Court involved constitutional challenges by 
members of the armed services to the facial validity of established 
military rules or regulations.134  Of the three viable actions cited by 
the Supreme Court, none involved a challenge to military personnel 
decisions, as was the case in Chappell.  While only one plaintiff was 
successful in her claim,135 all three were permitted access to the 
federal system without question.  As it was, the Court in Chappell 
began sketching the obscured line dividing justiciable from 
nonjusticiable equitable intramilitary actions. 
3. United States v. Stanley—The Equitable Exception to 
Intramilitary Immunity “Clarified” 
In 1987, the Supreme Court had a chance to clarify its holding 
in Chappell regarding the justiciability of intramilitary claims for 
equitable relief.  In United States v. Stanley,136 a military plaintiff 
brought Bivens actions against several military officials after he was 
secretly administered lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) as part of an 
Army scheme to test effects of the chemical on human subjects.137  
 
 132 Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304. 
 133 Id. (citing Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 
(1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)).  For an extended analysis of 
these decisions see infra Part IV.B. 
 134 Brown v. Glines involved a First Amendment challenge to an Air Force 
regulation that required members of the service to obtain approval from their 
commanding officers before circulating petitions on Air Force bases.  444 U.S. at 
349.  In Parker v. Levy, the plaintiff, an Army physician, challenged several articles of 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice under the First and Fifth Amendments.  417 
U.S. at 735-37.  Frontiero v. Richardson involved a Due Process challenge to a federal 
statute under the Fifth Amendment.  411 U.S. at 678-80.  For an extended analysis of 
these decisions see infra Part IV.B. 
 135 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690-91 (concluding that the differential treatment 
afforded male and female members of the armed services under the challenged 
federal statutes violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because of 
the requirement that female members prove the dependency of their husbands); see 
also infra Part IV.B. 
 136 483 U.S. 669 (1987). 
 137 Id. at 671-72.  The testing in this case resulted in severe personality changes to 
the plaintiff, and eventually led to the dissolution of his marriage.  Id. 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, relying 
on a misinterpretation of Chappell, upheld a district court ruling that 
the plaintiff could proceed with his Bivens claims because the alleged 
wrongs did not involve an officer-subordinate relationship, and, as 
such, did not implicate the disciplinary concerns articulated in 
Chappell.138  The Supreme Court, rejecting nearly every rationale 
offered by the court of appeals, held that the “special facto[r]” that 
“counsel[s] hesitation” in intramilitary actions is “the fact that 
congressionally uninvited intrusion into military affairs by the 
judiciary is inappropriate.”139  The Court concluded that no Bivens 
actions could be maintained for injuries that “arise out of or are in 
the course of activity incident to service.” 140  Thus, the Court 
effectively precluded all claims by service members seeking monetary 
damages against superior officers for constitutional violations 
suffered during military activity. 
The Stanley Court then expounded slightly upon its language in 
Chappell regarding the availability of equitable relief for military 
plaintiffs.  Justice Scalia, reciting the three decisions referred to in 
Chappell as examples of justiciable intramilitary claims,141 explained 
that those actions were maintainable in civilian forums because they 
were meant to “halt or prevent” constitutional violations rather than 
award monetary damages.142  Such cases, the Court explained further, 
can proceed because they seek traditional forms of relief rather than 
a “new kind of cause of action.”143  Thus, while both Chappell and 
Stanley addressed the equitable exception to intramilitary immunity, 
neither succeeded in precisely defining its scope. 
C. Chappell and Stanley Extended to § 1983 Claims 
The Supreme Court expressly declined to determine whether 
statutory claims for alleged constitutional violations against state 
officials were similarly precluded under the Chappell rationale.144  In 
 
 138 See Stanley v. United States, 786 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 139 Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683. 
 140 Id. at 684 (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 146). 
 141 See supra notes 133-34. 
 142 Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683. 
 143 Id. (quoting Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305 n.2). 
 144 See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305 n.3.  The Court stated: 
We leave it for the Court of Appeals to decide on remand whether the 
portion of respondents’ suit seeking damages flowing from an alleged 
conspiracy among petitioners in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) can be 
maintained.  This issue was not adequately addressed either by the 
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Butz v. Economou,145 however, the Court left little doubt that actions 
brought under § 1983 and those raised pursuant to Bivens must be 
treated identically, at least in terms of the immunity afforded 
government agents.146  This notion seems hardly controversial since 
the Supreme Court has long recognized that the issue of immunities 
is the same whether suits involve federal, state, or local officials.147  
Accordingly, several federal circuits, acknowledging the breadth of 
intramilitary immunity, have extended the doctrine to actions 
brought by military personnel against state officers, as well as federal 
officials acting under the color of state law, pursuant to § 1983.148  
Many courts extending intramilitary immunity to bar § 1983 claims 
have observed that the disruptive effects on military discipline are the 
same regardless of whether military plaintiffs seek damages against 
state agents under § 1983 or against federal officers pursuant to 
Bivens.149  Other federal courts, however, have expressly refused to 
apply Chappell to § 1983 claims.150  In Scott v. Rice,151 for example, the 
 
Court of Appeals or in the briefs and oral argument before this Court. 
Id.  42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2004) provides a private right of action to individuals when 
state actors conspire to deprive or interfere with constitutional rights. 
 145 438 U.S. 478, 500 (1978). 
 146 Id. at 500-02.  In Butz, the federal government argued that federal officials 
should receive greater immunity from Bivens claims than state officials receive from 
claims brought pursuant to § 1983.  Id. at 485.  The Court, however, rejected the 
government’s claim, stating that it is “untenable to draw a distinction . . . between 
suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the 
Constitution against federal officials.”  Id. at 504; see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800, 818 n.30 (1982) (following Butz). 
 147 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 265 
n.17 (1997) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 809). 
 148 See, e.g., Speigner v. Alexander, 248 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2001); Wigginton v. 
Centracchio, 205 F.3d 504, 510-12 (1st Cir. 2000); Jones v. N.Y. State Div. of Military 
& Naval Affairs, 166 F.3d 45, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1999); Wright v. Park, 5 F.3d 586, 591 (1st 
Cir. 1993); Crawford v. Tex. Army Nat’l Guard, 749 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1971); Jorden 
v. Nat’l Guard Bureau, 799 F.2d 99, 104-08 (3d Cir. 1986); Brown v. United States, 
739 F.2d 362, 367 (8th Cir. 1984); Martelon v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1348, 1350-51 (10th 
Cir. 1984). 
 149 See, e.g., Watson v. Ark. Nat’l Guard, 886 F.2d 1004, 1007 (8th Cir. 1989) (“The 
concern for the disruption of military discipline upon which Feres, Chappell, and 
Stanley are based applies equally when a court is asked to entertain an intra-military 
suit under § 1983.”). 
 150 See, e.g., Scott v. Rice, No. 92-2463, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 24641, at *6 (4th Cir. 
Sept. 23, 1993); Christofferson v. Wash. State Air Nat’l Guard, 855 F.2d 1437 (9th 
Cir. 1988).  These circuits have adopted the four-part Mindes test, first advanced in 
Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971), for determining whether certain 
intramilitary claims against military defendants may be maintained in civilian courts 
outside of the Bivens context.  Under the Mindes test, once an allegation has been 
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Fourth Circuit held that Chappell and Stanley were inapplicable to § 
1983 claims because the decisions involved judicially created actions 
for monetary damages brought directly under the Federal 
Constitution.152  In any instance, courts which have applied Chappell to 
§ 1983 actions have had the same difficulty determining which 
intramilitary claims brought under § 1983 for equitable relief are 
justiciable.153 
D. Conclusion 
The Supreme Court has, in recent years, inaugurated upon a 
campaign dedicated to broadening the scope of the intramilitary 
immunity doctrine.  While it is now clear that military plaintiffs may 
not sue their superior officers for monetary damages pursuant to 
Bivens, it is equally clear that the military’s freedom from suit is not 
absolute.154  Chappell and Stanley shed some light on the state of 
intramilitary justiciability, but the decisions did not succeed in 
precisely defining the scope of intramilitary immunity when an 
equitable remedy is sought.  As a result, federal courts have struggled 
to apply Chappell to equitable actions with any uniformity.155  This has 
led to uncertainty and inconsistency for military personnel seeking to 
enforce their constitutional rights in civilian forums.  This result is 
particularly objectionable because the viability of intramilitary claims 
now depends less upon the merits they promulgate and more upon 
the federal circuit in which they are promulgated.  Without 
categorical guidance by the Supreme Court on this issue, it appears 
 
adequately subjected to all available military remedies, a court “must examine the 
substance of that allegation in light of the policy reasons behind nonreview of 
military matters,” balancing four factors: (1) “The nature and strength of the 
plaintiff’s challenge to the military determination”; (2) “The potential injury to the 
plaintiff if review is refused”; (3) “The type and degree of anticipated interference 
with the military function”; and (4) “The extent to which the exercise of military 
expertise or discretion is involved.”  453 F.2d at 201.  The Ninth Circuit has since 
modified the Mindes test, although the substance of the four factors originally 
identified remains very much the same.  See Wenger v. Monroe, 282 F.3d 1068, 1072-
73 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 151 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 24641, at *5. 
 152 Id. at *6. 
 153 Compare Wigginton, 205 F.3d at 511-12 (finding a military plaintiff’s § 1983 
claim for reinstatement was justiciable pursuant to Feres, Chappell, and Stanley), with 
Crawford, 794 F.2d at 1036-37 (concluding that plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for 
reinstatement were nonjusticiable pursuant to Feres, Chappell, and Stanley). 
 154 See Dibble v. Fenimore, 339 F.3d 120, 126 (2003). 
 155 See id. 
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that the precise scope of equitable relief available to military 
personnel in civilian courts will remain entirely unsettled. 
III. THE DISAGREEMENT AMONG FEDERAL CIRCUITS REGARDING THE 
AVAILABILITY OF EQUITABLE RELIEF FOR MILITARY PLAINTIFFS 
Since Chappell, courts across the country have questioned 
whether the decision should be interpreted narrowly, based on its 
holding, or broadly, based on its reasoning.156  Two general camps 
have subsequently emerged among federal circuits regarding the 
availability of equitable relief for military plaintiffs.  The First, Third, 
and Tenth Circuits have adopted an exceptionally narrow 
interpretation of the Feres-Chappell-Stanley trilogy, and have embraced 
the principle that those cases swallowed up all potential damages 
claims, but left the area of equitable relief untouched.157  Accordingly, 
these circuits have entertained equitable claims attacking military 
personnel decisions that were not facial challenges to the 
constitutionality of military rules or regulations.  In contrast, the 
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits have 
interpreted the governing rule to allow equitable protests only when 
they constitute broad challenges to the constitutionality of military 
regulations, and not in cases involving individualized personnel 
decisions.158 
A. Courts Adopting a Narrow Interpretation of Intramilitary Immunity 
by Allowing Actions that Challenge Military Personnel Decisions 
The First, Third, and Tenth Circuits have embraced a narrow 
interpretation of intramilitary immunity as it relates to the availability 
of equitable relief for aggrieved members of the military.159  
According to these courts, intramilitary immunity establishes only a 
per se prohibition of damages actions, so that requests for equitable 
relief against the armed services remain, as a general matter, 
justiciable.  Accordingly, these circuits are quick to entertain actions 
by military subordinates protesting the personnel decisions of their 
superiors, so long as the relief sought happens to be equitable.160 
The Third Circuit affirmed this position in Jorden v. National 
 
 156 See Jorden, 799 F.2d at 107 (surveying case law on this issue). 
 157 See Dibble, 339 F.3d at 126-28. 
 158 Id. 
 159 See id. at 126. 
 160 See id. 
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Guard Bureau.161  In Jorden, the court confronted the scope of 
susceptibility of National Guard officers to actions by guardsmen 
seeking reinstatement as an equitable remedy.162  That case arose 
when the plaintiff, a member of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard 
(“PaANG”), filed a civil rights action pursuant to § 1983 in a federal 
district court alleging that several of his superior officers conspired to 
harass and discharge him on the basis of race and in retaliation for 
exercising his First Amendment rights.163  Recognizing that the 
Supreme Court failed to pronounce a bright-line rule concerning the 
justiciability of equitable suits, the Third Circuit held that equitable 
actions against military defendants were presumed justiciable.164 
In its opinion, the Third Circuit recounted the historical 
development of intramilitary immunity as it relates to injunctive relief 
and highlighted several instances in which the Supreme Court 
entertained equitable claims raised against the armed services 
without suggesting such actions were beyond the judicial boundaries 
of the federal system.165  In particular, the court highlighted three 
decisions, Gilligan v. Morgan,166 Goldman v. Weinberger,167 and Brown v. 
Glines,168 in which the Supreme Court failed to raise issues of 
justiciability even though each involved equitable claims in a military 
context.169  The Jorden court noted that Gilligan involved an equitable 
claim by citizens against the Ohio National Guard.170  Although the 
Supreme Court ultimately held the claim inappropriate for judicial 
deliverance because of the broad nature of the equitable relief 
sought, the Third Circuit found credence in Chief Justice Burger’s 
explicit finding that military “conduct” was not “always beyond 
judicial review.”171 
 
 161 799 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1986).  The Third Circuit adopted this position earlier in 
Dillard v. Brown, 652 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1981).  Dillard, however, preceded the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Chappell, and, as such, is less relevant for purposes of 
this discussion. 
 162 799 F.2d at 100. 
 163 Id. at 102. 
 164 Id. at 109.  The court noted rare exceptions to this general rule in cases where 
the relief sought involves court action well outside of its judicial capacity and 
function.  See id. (citing Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 7 (1973)). 
 165 Id. at 108-09. 
 166 413 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 167 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
 168 444 U.S. 348 (1980). 
 169 Jorden, 799 F.2d at 108-09. 
 170 Id. at 108. 
 171 Id. at 108-09 (citing Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 11-12). 
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The Third Circuit also relied on the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Goldman to bolster its conclusion that equitable suits were indeed 
justiciable.172  That case involved a First Amendment challenge to a 
military regulation prohibiting a serviceman, an orthodox Jew and 
ordained rabbi, from wearing a yarmulke while on duty and in 
uniform.173  Although the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the 
regulation, the Jorden court emphasized that the claim was 
entertained without concerns over justiciability.174 
Finally, the Third Circuit recognized the 1980 Supreme Court 
decision of Brown v. Glines, which involved a First Amendment 
challenge to an Air Force regulation prohibiting the circulation of 
on-base petitions.175  Specifically, the Third Circuit seized upon 
footnoted language in which Justice Powell suggested that legitimate 
constitutional challenges could arise from the application of military 
rules and regulations.176  In the view of the Third Circuit, such 
language confirmed that “judicial scrutiny was not limited to facial 
constitutional challenges.”177  Taken together, the Third Circuit 
concluded, Gilligan, Goldman, and Brown verified that equitable claims 
against the military are generally reviewable, notwithstanding rare 
exceptions when the relief sought “would involve the court in tasks 
well outside of its capacity and function.”178 
The Third Circuit also held that allowing equitable remedies for 
aggrieved military plaintiffs, while denying monetary relief, was 
supported by the policy considerations underlying Chappell.179  
Recognizing that Chappell was based largely upon concerns that 
judicial interference in military matters would undermine the process 
of military decision-making, the Third Circuit reasoned that the 
threat of injunctions would do little to inhibit the vigorous decision-
 
 172 Id. at 110. 
 173 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 504-05. 
 174 Jorden, 799 F.2d at 109. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 110 (citing Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 357 n.15 (1980)).  Brown was 
one of three cases cited by the Supreme Court in Chappell as an example of a viable 
intramilitary claim.  See infra Part IV.B.  In Brown, Justice Powell suggested that 
legitimate claims could be raised under the First Amendment when military 
regulations are applied “irrationally, invidiously, or arbitrarily.”  Brown, 444 U.S. at 
357 n.15 (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976)). 
 177 Jorden, 799 F.2d at 109. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. at 110. 
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making required of military officials.180  In short, the Third Circuit 
assumed that judicial intervention in the form of equitable relief 
would have negligible impacts on the aspects of military structure 
that the Supreme Court focused on in Chappell—namely, the need to 
preserve military discipline.181  Accordingly, the Third Circuit held 
that the plaintiff was entitled to reinstatement upon showing that the 
discharge amounted to a violation of his constitutional rights.182  
More significantly, the court established a clear precedent in light of 
Chappell that permits judicial review in situations involving 
individualized military personnel decisions. 
The Tenth and First Circuits have since followed Jorden’s 
rationale and adopted narrow interpretations of the intramilitary 
immunity doctrine.  These circuits also allow military service 
members to challenge the personnel decisions of their superior 
officers, although their analyses on the issue have been somewhat less 
comprehensive.  In Walden v. Bartlett,183 the Tenth Circuit held that 
Chappell and Stanley together support the proposition that claims for 
equitable relief challenging military decision-making are justiciable.184  
The plaintiff in that case, a member of the United States Army, was 
convicted by court-martial for military crimes committed while on 
active duty and sought injunctive and declaratory judgments for 
alleged due process violations by military officials during disciplinary 
proceedings.185  The court recognized that Chappell did not 
categorically preclude equitable remedies for military plaintiffs, and 
noted the Supreme Court’s holding in Stanley that service members’ 
claims designed to “halt or prevent the constitutional violation rather 
than the award of money damages” were cognizable in the civilian 
system.186  In addition, the Tenth Circuit, echoing the First Circuit’s 
sentiments in Jorden, reasoned that the rationales underlying Feres and 
its progeny were not implicated by the issuance of federal injunctions 
 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at 111. 
 183 840 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 184 See id. at 774-75. 
 185 Id. at 772.  Plaintiff sought injunctive relief in the form of restoration of good 
time credits, prohibition of his summary transfer to segregated housing, and removal 
of a lieutenant colonel as the presiding officer of the United States Disciplinary 
Barracks Disciplinary and Adjustment Board in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  Id.  
Plaintiff also sought a declaratory judgment that the military violated his 
constitutional rights.  Id. 
 186 Id. at 775 (quoting Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683). 
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because the threat of judicial intervention in the form of equitable 
relief would have de minimus effects on the institution of military 
discipline.187  In so determining, the court noted that “our citizens in 
uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have 
doffed their civilian clothes.”188 
In Wigginton v. Centracchio,189 the First Circuit held that a § 1983 
claim for reinstatement brought by a member of the Rhode Island 
Army National Guard against his superiors was justiciable.  In its 
decision, the court again acknowledged that Chappell itself did not 
foreclose all civil redress where military service members raise 
constitutional violations.190  The circuit court also referenced an 
extended opinion in Stanley, in which Justice Brennan, joined by 
Justice Marshall, concurring in part and dissenting in part, suggested 
that the field of equitable relief remained undisturbed, insofar as it 
relates to halting constitutional violations.191  Based entirely upon 
these findings, the First Circuit held that, in general, military claims 
seeking review of personnel decisions were cognizable in the federal 
system.192 
The Third, Tenth, and First Circuits, therefore, can be 
categorized neatly as those that allow military personnel to challenge 
the decision-making of their superior officers, provided the action 
involves a constitutional question and calls for an equitable remedy.  
Several justifications have been proffered in the process: namely, the 
Supreme Court’s failure to categorically preclude such actions and 
the Court’s historical willingness to entertain equitable claims, in 
some cases without raising issues of justiciability.  More notably, these 
circuits have determined, as a policy matter, that the threat of 
declaratory and injunctive relief does little to inhibit autonomous 
decision-making on the part of military officials, so that the 
effectiveness of military establishments are not disrupted by equitable 
intervention on the part of the civilian judiciary. 
 
 
 187 840 F.2d at 774 (reasoning that “the rationales supporting Feres are not 
implicated by an action for injunctive and declaratory relief”). 
 188 Id. at 775 (quoting Chief Justice Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 
37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 188 (1962)). 
 189 205 F.3d 504 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 190 Id. at 512. 
 191 Id. at 513. 
 192 Id. 
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B. Circuits Adopting a Broad Interpretation of Intramilitary Immunity 
by Precluding Actions that Challenge Military Personnel Decisions 
The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits 
have adopted a much broader interpretation of the intramilitary 
immunity doctrine, and have embraced the view that equitable 
intramilitary actions are only justiciable when they amount to broad 
challenges to the constitutionality of military rules or regulations.193  
These circuits recognize a governing principal that discourages 
judicial interference in the form of equitable relief, and will not 
entertain claims challenging individualized military decision-
making.194  This approach derives largely from the reasoning 
underlying the Supreme Court’s decisions in Feres, Chappell, and 
Stanley, rather than the specific holdings of each case.195 
The Fifth Circuit first addressed the intramilitary immunity issue 
as it applies to equitable relief in Crawford v. Texas Army National 
Guard.196  In that case, plaintiffs, members of the Texas Army National 
Guard (“TARNG”), filed § 1983 claims against the service, the 
governor of Texas, and twelve other military personnel, seeking 
equitable relief in the form of reinstatement after they were allegedly 
dismissed from the service in violation of their constitutional rights.197  
The circuit court, relying on the three separate decisions deemed 
appropriate for judicial review by the Supreme Court in Chappell, 
found that the governing principle derived from those decisions is 
that civilian courts may not exercise unlimited review over 
intramilitary matters.198  The scope of intramilitary suits amenable to 
civil law, the court stated, was “at the very least, narrowly 
circumscribed.”199  The Crawford court then noted that each of the 
intramilitary actions cited by the Supreme Court in Chappell involved 
facial challenges to the constitutionality of military regulations, and 
none required judicial oversight of military decision-making.200  As the 
 
 193 See Dibble v. Fenimore, 339 F.3d 120, 126 (2003). 
 194 Id. 
 195 See supra Parts II.A & B. 
 196 794 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 197 Id. at 1035.  Plaintiffs in Crawford claimed that they were improperly dismissed 
or put on inactive reserve for reporting criminal activity, and alleged that black 
personnel were discriminated against and mistreated by the TARNG.  Id. 
 198 Id. at 1036-37.  The court in Crawford cited the Supreme Court rulings in Feres, 
Chappell, and Shearer to bolster its conclusion as to the justiciability of intramilitary 
claims.  See id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Crawford, 794 F.2d at 1036. 
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Fifth Circuit noted, “[t]he nature of the lawsuits, rather than the 
relief sought, rendered them justiciable.”201  If exercised without 
judicial caution, the court warned, the equitable exception advocated 
by the plaintiffs could “swallow Chappell’s rule of deference” 
entirely.202  Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
claims for reinstatement and suggested that equitable actions be 
proscribed in much the same fashion as those seeking monetary 
relief.203  Indeed, the court proclaimed, injunctive claims, “like those for 
monetary damages, must be carefully regulated in order to prevent 
intrusion of the courts into the military structure.”204 
Three years later, the Eighth Circuit, in Watson v. Arkansas 
National Guard,205 addressed the availability of equitable relief for 
military plaintiffs in situations involving personnel decisions.  In 
Watson, the plaintiff, alleging racial discrimination, brought an action 
for reinstatement against the Arkansas National Guard and several 
military personnel.206  Finding plaintiff’s claims nonjusticiable, the 
Watson court concerned itself primarily with the underlying policies 
upon which Feres and its progeny were based, and reasoned that those 
concerns, together with subsequent Supreme Court cases 
expounding upon the intramilitary immunity doctrine, “weigh[ed] 
heavily in favor of precluding claims for equitable relief.”207  In 
particular, the court cited the military’s unique need for 
“unhesitating and decisive action by military officers and equally 
disciplined responses by enlisted personnel,”208 and opined that such 
concerns were undermined each time soldiers drag a superior officer 
into court.209  Thus, the Watson court embraced the notion that claims 
for monetary and equitable relief should be treated somewhat 
similarly, and categorically rejected the Third Circuit’s contention in 
Jorden that the prospect of injunctive relief does not threaten the 
institution of military discipline.210  Indeed, as the Eighth Circuit 
noted, “the threat to the ‘special nature of military life’ is present 
 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. at 1036-37. 
 204 Id. (emphasis added); see also Farmer v. Mabus, 940 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(following Crawford). 
 205 886 F.2d 1004, 1008 (1989). 
 206 Id. at 1004-05. 
 207 Id. at 1008. 
 208 Id. (citing Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304). 
 209 Id. 
 210 See id. 
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regardless of the remedy the soldier seeks.”211  The court concluded 
that “disallow[ing] claims for damages while agreeing to review 
claims for injunctive relief arising from the same facts would be to 
exalt form over substance.”212 
The D.C. and Seventh Circuits have taken a similar approach, 
concluding that claims challenging personnel decisions lie outside 
the purview of the federal judiciary.  In Kreis v. Secretary of the Air 
Force,213 for example, the D.C. Circuit dismissed as nonreviewable a 
plaintiff’s claim for retroactive promotion.  Although the court did 
not rely directly on Chappell, it expressed similar concerns.214  In 
particular, the D.C. Circuit was troubled that judicial meddling in 
such instances would violate the separation of powers and 
emphasized that the Constitution vests exclusive authority over the 
military to the legislative and executive branches of government.215  As 
a result, the court concluded that civilian courts are “inherently 
unsuitable” and incompetent to oversee such matters.216  Likewise, the 
Seventh Circuit, in Knutson v. Wisconsin Air National Guard,217 held 
that a service member’s due process claim seeking injunctive relief 
and reinstatement was nonjusticiable.  The Knutson court focused 
primarily on the practical effects that judicial review over personnel 
decisions would pose on the National Guard’s effectiveness.  
Specifically, the court recognized that reinstatement claims often 
linger unresolved for years, and would thus impede the military’s 
ability to properly staff, train, and otherwise operate.218 
 
 211 Watson, 886 F.2d at 1008 (citing Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304). 
 212 Id. at 1009; see also Wood v. United States, 968 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(following Watson); Uhl v. Swanstrom, 876 F. Supp. 1545 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (same); 
Becker v. Rice, 827 F. Supp. 589 (W.D. Ark. 1993) (same). 
 213 866 F.2d 1508, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  The plaintiff in that case, a major in the 
United States Air Force, was accused of “acting inappropriately” during an overseas 
military trip.  Id. at 1509.  As a result, the plaintiff was reprimanded and denied an 
assignment to a position of greater responsibility.  Id. 
 214 See id. at 1511-12.  The court in Kreis found that Chappell was not controlling, 
and relied instead on two earlier Supreme Court decisions, Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 
U.S. 83 (1953), and Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973), to dismiss plaintiff’s claim.  
Id. at 1512. 
 215 Id. at 1511. 
 216 Kreis, 866 F.2d at 1511; see also Schamburg v. White, No. 02-5063, 2003 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 9427, at *2 (D.C. Cir. May 14, 2003) (following Kreis); Ostrow v. Sec’y of 
the Air Force, No. 93-5280, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 3200, at *6 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 
1995) (per curiam) (same); Cargill v. Marsh, No. 89-5296, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 
7977, at *3 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 1990) (per curiam) (same). 
 217 995 F.2d 765, 771 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 218 Id. 
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The most recent court to address this issue was the Second 
Circuit in Dibble v. Fenimore.219  In that case, the plaintiff, a staff 
sergeant in the New York Air National Guard, brought a claim against 
his superior officer after he was allegedly discharged and denied re-
enlistment in retaliation for exercising his constitutionally protected 
right to engage in union activity.220  The Second Circuit held that the 
doctrine of intramilitary immunity rendered the plaintiff’s claim 
nonjusticiable.221  After acknowledging that the Supreme Court had 
not precisely defined the line separating justiciable from 
nonjusticiable intramilitary claims, the court found that Chappell and 
Stanley disfavored judicial intervention when individual military 
personnel decisions are challenged.222  The court also expressly 
rejected the Third Circuit’s policy judgment that equitable 
interference by the judiciary would involve negligible threats to 
military decision-making and discipline.223  The court went on to 
propose that judicial intervention in the form of equitable relief 
could detract greatly from military effectiveness by altering the 
“peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors.”224  
Although the Second Circuit recognized rare exceptions in which 
judicial review would be appropriate,225 the court clearly followed in 
the footsteps of Crawford and Watson by adopting a judicial policy that 
precludes justiciability where military claims challenge personnel 
decisions.226 
The Fourth Circuit has taken an entirely different analytic 
approach than the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. 
Circuits—at least as applied to § 1983 claims—but has nonetheless 
similarly limited the equitable exception to intramilitary immunity to 
preclude claims challenging military decision-making.  This circuit 
 
 219 339 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 220 Id. at 122-23. 
 221 Id. at 127-28. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. at 128 (citing Brown, 348 U.S. at 112). 
 225 See Dibble, 339 F.3d at 128.  The court held that “where the military has failed to 
follow its own mandatory regulations in a manner substantially prejudicing a service 
member,” judicial intervention is appropriate to redress the prejudice.  Id. (quoting 
Jones v. N.Y. State Div. of Military & Naval Affairs, 166 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1998)); see 
also Jones, 166 F.3d at 52 (allowing claim for injunctive relief by a military plaintiff 
when the military “failed to follow its own mandatory regulations in a manner 
substantially prejudicing a service member”). 
 226 Dibble, 339 F.3d at 128. 
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has expressly refused to apply Chappell and Stanley to § 1983 claims, 
and has instead applied the multi-factored Mindes test, first outlined 
by the Fifth Circuit in Mindes v. Seaman.227  In Scott v. Rice,228 for 
example, the Fourth Circuit found that civilian review of a § 1983 
sexual discrimination claim challenging military decision-making was 
inappropriate because it would impede commanding officers in 
“exercising [their] own discretion and military expertise with respect 
to personnel matters.”229  Thus, while the court’s particular approach 
in analyzing that availability of equitable relief for military plaintiffs 
differs, the Fourth Circuit similarly precludes review in cases 
involving personnel decision-making. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT WILL EVENTUALLY ADOPT                                     
A MORE COMPREHENSIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE INTRAMILITARY 
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE AND PRECLUDE ALL CLAIMS THAT DO NOT 
AMOUNT TO BROAD CHALLENGES OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
MILITARY REGULATIONS 
Although the Supreme Court has not precisely defined the 
scope of equitable relief available to military plaintiffs, existing 
precedent gives every indication that the Court, when eventually 
faced with the issue, will hold that intramilitary immunity bars all 
claims for equitable relief, except where the action involves a facial 
challenge to the constitutionality of a military edict.  Thus, the Court 
will inevitably side with the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, 
and D.C. Circuits, and expand intramilitary immunity once more to 
preclude all equitable claims that challenge individualized personnel 
decisions. 
A. The Supreme Court has Long Forewarned of the Dangers Posed 
when the Civilian Judiciary Inappropriately Intrudes into Matters 
Involving Military Discipline, Training, or Readiness 
In Orloff v. Willoughby230 and Gilligan v. Morgan,231 the Supreme 
Court was asked to exercise judicial authority over military personnel 
decisions and, in both cases, refused to do so.  In Orloff, the Court 
 
 227 452 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971); see also supra notes 150-52 and accompanying 
text. 
 228 No. 92-2463, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 24641, at *7 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 1993). 
 229 Id. 
 230 345 U.S. 83 (1953). 
 231 413 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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considered whether an Army doctor, as a matter of law, was entitled 
to military commission, and whether federal courts, by writ of habeas 
corpus, have the power to discharge a member of the armed services 
upon finding discrimination in assignments to duty.232  As to the 
question of the doctor’s commission, the Court found that it had no 
power whatsoever to influence or control the appointment of military 
positions.233  The Court recognized the exclusive discretionary power 
of the executive over such matters and noted that “[w]hether Orloff 
deserves appointment is not for judges to say.”234  The Court then 
addressed whether it could properly exercise judicial review of the 
plaintiff’s medical duty assignments in order to respond to his 
request for a court-ordered discharge.235  The Court, again 
recognizing the “large area of discretion as to particular duties” left 
to commanding officers, refused to exercise jurisdiction, and, in an 
oft-quoted passage, remarked: 
We know that from top to bottom of the Army the complaint 
is often made, and sometimes with justification, that there is 
discrimination, favoritism or other objectionable handling of 
men.  But judges are not given the task of running the Army.  The 
responsibility for setting up channels through which such grievances can 
be considered and fairly settled rests upon the Congress and upon the 
President of the United States and his subordinates.  The military 
constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate 
discipline from that of the civilian.  Orderly government requires 
that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate 
Army matters . . . . While the courts have found occasion to 
determine whether one has been lawfully inducted and is 
therefore within the jurisdiction of the Army and subject to its 
orders, we have found no case where this Court has assumed to 
revise duty orders as to one lawfully in the service.236 
 
 232 Orloff, 345 U.S. at 84-85.  The Court also faced the issue of whether to accept 
the government’s concession that a military statute be interpreted to require the 
Army to assign specially inducted medical personnel to duties within the category 
that rendered them eligible for induction.  Id. at 87-88.  While the Court found that 
it was not bound by the government’s concession, it nonetheless agreed with its 
statutory interpretation.  Id. 
 233 Id. at 90. 
 234 Id. at 91-92.  The Court noted that “[i]t is obvious that the commissioning of 
officers in the Army is a matter of discretion within the province of the President as 
Commander in Chief.  Whatever control courts have exerted over tenure or 
compensation under an appointment, they have never assumed by any process to 
control the appointing power either in civilian or military positions.”  Id. at 90. 
 235 Orloff, 345 U.S. at 92. 
 236 Id. at 93-94 (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, in Gilligan, the Supreme Court was asked to review 
claims that were not constitutional challenges to military regulations.  
In that case, plaintiffs challenged actions taken by the Ohio Governor 
and the state’s military personnel, and asked the Court to maintain 
continued surveillance over the “pattern of training, weaponry, and 
orders in the Ohio National Guard.”237  Perhaps not surprisingly, the 
Court, citing many of the same concerns raised in Orloff, refused to 
exercise jurisdiction.  In finding the claim nonjusticiable, the Court 
noted the inappropriateness and impracticality of the judicial relief 
requested and stated: “Any such relief, whether it prescribed standards 
of training and weaponry or simply ordered compliance with the 
standards set by Congress and/or the Executive, would necessarily draw 
the courts into a nonjusticiable political question, over which we have no 
jurisdiction.”238  Moreover, in another strongly worded indication of 
the Court’s aptitude in such matters, Chief Justice Burger, writing for 
the majority, warned: 
It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type 
of governmental action that was intended by the Constitution to 
be left to the political branches directly responsible . . . . 
Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental 
activity in which the courts have less competence.  The complex, 
subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, 
equipping, and control of a military force are essentially 
professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control 
of the Legislative and Executive Branches.239 
More recently, in United States v. Shearer,240 the Court addressed 
the justiciability of a negligence action raised pursuant to the FTCA.  
Chief Justice Burger, reasserting the vitality of intramilitary immunity, 
explained that: 
To permit this type of suit would mean that commanding officers 
would have to stand prepared to convince a civilian court of the 
wisdom of a wide range of military and disciplinary decisions; for 
example, whether to overlook a particular incident or episode, 
 
 237 Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 4.  Students and officers of the student government of 
Kent State University filed this claim after the shootings that took place in 1970.  Id. 
at 3.  The complaint alleged that the National Guard, called to order by the 
Governor of Ohio, violated students’ rights to assembly and free speech and caused 
injury and death to several without legal justification.  Id. 
 238 Id. at 9 (emphasis in original) (quoting Morgan v. Rhodes, 456 F.2d 608, 619 
(6th Cir. 1972)). 
 239 Id. at 10. 
 240 473 U.S. 52 (1985). 
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whether to discharge a serviceman, and whether and how to place 
restraints on a soldier’s off-base conduct.241 
Thus, although Shearer involved a damages claim, it expressed the 
same principle set forth in Orloff and Gilligan—that civilian courts 
cannot sit in plenary review over intramilitary disputes. 
B. Chappell and Stanley Suggest that Only Broad Constitutional 
Challenges to Military Regulations are Justiciable in Federal Courts 
Certainly, the clearest instructions so far provided by the 
Supreme Court regarding the availability of equitable relief for 
military plaintiffs came in the Chappell and Stanley decisions.  In 
Chappell, the Court, reiterating that soldiers are not stripped of all 
basic rights by virtue of their military status, acknowledged that 
military plaintiffs are not barred from all civil redress for 
constitutional wrongs suffered during military service.242  The Chappell 
Court then cited Brown v. Glines,243 Parker v. Levy,244 and Frontiero v. 
Richardson,245 as examples of claims that can be appropriately 
maintained by military plaintiffs in civilian venues.  As explained 
subsequently in Stanley, those suits were justiciable because they 
“referred to redress designed to halt or prevent . . . constitutional 
violation[s].”246  These cited decisions are significant because they all 
dealt with facial challenges to the constitutionality of military 
regulations, and none involved individualized military decision-
making.247 
In Brown v. Glines, an enlisted serviceman challenged the 
constitutionality of an Air Force regulation that required service 
members first to obtain permission from their commanding officers 
before distributing petitions on Air Force bases.248  The Court 
reviewed whether that regulation violated the soldier’s rights to free 
 
 241 Id. at 58. 
 242 Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304. 
 243 444 U.S. 348 (1980). 
 244 417 U.S. 733 (1974). 
 245 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 246 Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683 (citing Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304). 
 247 See Crawford, 794 F.2d at 1036-37 (“The common characteristic of these 
decisions is that they involve challenges to the facial validity of military regulations 
and were not tied to discrete personnel matters.”). 
 248 444 U.S. at 349-50 (citing Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3)(a)(1) & (2) (1970), which 
allows commanders to deny the distribution of petitions that would result in “a clear 
danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of members of the Armed Forces, or 
material interference with the accomplishment of a military mission”). 
  
734 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:699 
 
 
speech guaranteed under the First Amendment, and whether the 
rule violated 10 U.S.C § 1034.249  The plaintiff in that case, a captain 
in the Air Force Reserves, was removed from active duty for 
circulating on-base petitions without the consent of his commanding 
officer.250  The Court dismissed both claims, holding that the 
regulation did not violate the First Amendment because the 
constitutional protections related to free speech afforded military 
personnel were less substantial than those attributed to civilians.251  
The Court also found that the Air Force regulation did not violate § 
1034 because the statute was not enacted to protect the circulation of 
petitions on military grounds.252  Most importantly, the Court 
confined its ruling to the constitutionality of the military regulation 
challenged, and never considered the individualized actions of 
Glines’ superior officers. 
The two other cases cited by the Court in Chappell and Stanley as 
examples of justiciable intramilitary controversies presented broad 
constitutional challenges similar to those raised in Brown.  In Parker v. 
Levy,253 the Supreme Court entertained a claim brought by an Army 
physician who was court-martialed after he violated Army regulations 
by urging enlisted men to disobey orders to partake in the Vietnam 
War.  After his court-martial conviction and exhaustion of military 
avenues of redress, the plaintiff sought habeas corpus relief in federal 
court challenging his sentence on the grounds that two military 
articles invoked during his conviction were unconstitutionally vague 
and overbroad.254  The Court dismissed both claims, recognizing 
throughout its opinion the differences between military and civilian 
society—the former subject to more permissible constitutional 
restrictions than the latter.255  Likewise, in Frontiero v. Richardson,256 the 
 
 249 Id.  10 U.S.C. § 1034 (2004) prohibits unwarranted proscriptions on a service 
member’s right to communicate with members of Congress.  Id.  The statute provides 
that “[no] person may restrict any member of an armed force in communicating 
with a member of Congress, unless the communication is unlawful or violates a 
regulation necessary to the security of the United States.”  Id. at 358. 
 250 Id. at 351. 
 251 Id. at 354 (citing Parker, 417 U.S. at 758) (stating that “the different character 
of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application 
of [First Amendment] protections”). 
 252 444 U.S. at 360-61. 
 253 417 U.S. 733 (1974). 
 254 Id. at 735-38. 
 255 See id. at 743-62. 
 256 411 U.S. 677, 678-79 (1973).  The four statutes at issue were 37 U.S.C. §§ 401, 
403 (2004), and 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1076 (2004).  Id. 
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Court reviewed the constitutionality of four statutes which provided, 
solely for administrative convenience, that servicemen could claim 
their wives as “dependents” regardless of whether their spouse was 
actually dependent for support, but that spouses of servicewomen 
were not “dependents” unless they relied on their wives for more 
than fifty percent of their income.  An aggrieved servicewoman 
challenged the constitutionality of the statutes when she was denied 
increased benefits for her husband because she was unable to 
demonstrate that he was dependent upon her for more than one-half 
of his support.257  The Frontiero Court found that the regulations 
violated the First and Fifth Amendments—insofar as they required 
women, and not men, to demonstrate the dependency of their 
spouses—primarily because the government provided no legitimate 
purpose for the disparate treatment.258 
The fundamental feature in Brown, Parker, and Frontiero, is that 
each case involved broad constitutional challenges to military rules 
and regulations, and none invoked judicial review of personnel 
decision-making.259  In comparing these decisions with Gilligan and 
Orloff, where the Supreme Court was asked to review challenges tied 
to military decision-making, it appears more likely that the Court 
based determinations of justiciability on the constitutional nature of 
the claims raised, rather than on the relief requested.260  It stands to 
reason, therefore, that the Supreme Court will next expand 
intramilitary immunity to preclude claims challenging military 
decision-making. 
C. The Equitable Exception to Intramilitary Immunity Promulgated by 
the First, Third, and Tenth Circuits is inconsistent with 
Chappell’s Rule of Deference 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that judicial deference 
“is at its apogee” when evaluating military actions.261  Certainly, the 
 
 257 Id. at 680.  A male service member in the plaintiff’s position would have been 
provided increased benefits automatically.  Id. 
 258 Id. at 690-91.  The determining factor in the case was that the differential 
treatment between male and female officers provided for under the challenged 
statutes was for the sole purpose of administrative convenience, and not to serve any 
compelling military purpose.  Id.  In addition, the government was unable to 
persuade the Court that the differential treatment in fact saved any money with 
regard to administration.  411 U.S. at 688-91. 
 259 See Crawford, 794 F.2d at 1036. 
 260 See id. 1036-37. 
 261 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); see also Weiss v. United States, 510 
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Chappell and Stanley decisions were rationalized primarily on those 
grounds,262 and the cases are illustrative of the unique deference that 
the Supreme Court has historically been willing to afford the 
military.263  Not surprisingly, federal circuits on both sides of the 
equitable divide have acknowledged this reality.264  Notwithstanding 
the wisdom of affording such deference,265 however, the equitable 
loophole advocated by the First, Third, and Tenth Circuits is entirely 
inconsistent with Chappell because it renders all intramilitary claims 
justiciable, so long as a constitutional violation is alleged and the 
remedy sought happens to be equitable.266  As the Fifth Circuit 
correctly noted, such an exception “could swallow Chappell’s rule of 
deference” completely.267  The Supreme Court, therefore, in order to 
accommodate the rule of deference that provided the foundation for 
its decision in Chappell, must preclude intramilitary claims that 
challenge individualized personnel decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
From its inception in Feres, the Supreme Court has consistently 
broadened the scope of intramilitary immunity.  Along the way, a 
clear principle has emerged that comprehensive judicial deference is 
required by civilian courts dealing with intramilitary claims.  The 
somewhat ambiguous nature of the instructions provided by the 
Supreme Court regarding the availability of equitable relief for 
military plaintiffs, however, has led to a disjointed understanding 
among the federal circuits as to the precise breadth of the 
intramilitary immunity doctrine.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s 
historical hesitancy to deal with such matters, the directions so far 
provided in Chappell and Stanley regarding the availability of equitable 
relief, and the rule of deference underlying Chappell all suggest that 
claims challenging individualized personnel decisions are next in line 
 
U.S. 163 (1994) (following Rostker). 
 262 See supra Parts II.B.2 & 3. 
 263 See supra Part IV.A. 
 264 See, e.g., Jorden v. Nat’l Guard Bureau, 799 F.2d 99, 110 (3d Cir. 1986); 
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IOWA L. REV. 93 (1985); Karen A. Ruzic, Note and Comment, Military Justice and the 
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to be precluded. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly forewarned of the dangers 
posed when civilian courts haphazardly meddle in military matters.  
Additionally, where the Supreme Court has sat in review of 
intramilitary suits, it is more plausible that justiciability was 
appropriate because of the constitutional nature of the actions 
involved, and not because the relief sought happened to be 
equitable.  To be sure, the unifying characteristic of the cases cited in 
Chappell as examples of justiciable intramilitary claims is that each 
raised broad constitutional challenges to military regulations, and 
none invoked judicial review of military decision-making.  Finally, the 
equitable loophole advocated by the First, Third, and Tenth Circuits 
cannot be reconciled with Chappell’s rule of deference because it 
allows all intramilitary actions for alleged constitutional violations 
through the doors of civilian courthouses, provided an equitable 
remedy is sought.  To base justiciability on such an arbitrary 
condition would be to ignore the substance of Feres, Chappell, and 
Stanley.  Thus, the Supreme Court will again expand intramilitary 
immunity to preclude intramilitary claims that challenge personnel 
decisions because the intramilitary immunity doctrine as currently 
formulated can accommodate no other result. 
 
